The Hoplite phalanx

[Rob Miles]

Unfortunately, sources close to the time only tend to make a point of something if it was significant to them. We would not need to explain to ourselves that helicopters fly forwards and go up and down, but someone in 4516 may be on this forum expressing frustration that some revisionist with an indoor job and no heavy lifting who needs to pay his plasma bill insists the evidence suggests they flew upside down and sideways.

The increased depth was a significant enough difference to warrant inclusion. Xenophon would have assumed EVERYONE knew what hoplites did normally.

However, one more point of relevance here--  if depth was important to spearmen, does any set of rules allow for this beyond the assumption that at least one more rank adds its spears to the first? I mean, if you refought a battle like this with 50 (48) ranks of hoplites against 6 (Spartans are thought to have used multiples of 6, hence 300 Spartans make a phalanx 50 wide and 6 deep), would the deeper phalanx have any advantage under given rules? I know 6th edition etc. Had 'one casualty per figure' type advantages, but what now? Writing as a newbie who has yet to read DBMM.

[Rob Miles]

Just come across these daft buggers... www.4hoplites.com. Seems their experiments have come up with the same view as the traditional (ie correct ) one!

[Patrick Waterson]

Without prejudice to Rob's other points and observations:

Hoplites did not want to destroy their spears to pieces on the first rush, hence they rarely ran at another phalanx.

Not so sure about this: at First Mantinea (418 BC), the Argives, Athenians and allies closed 'dromon' - at a run.  Spartans seem to have been used to a more deliberate pace of advance (keeping time with the flutes/pipes) and this may be why Agis' attempts to reconfigure his line ran out of time and ended up in a mess.  I seem to recall other instances of hoplites closing at a run, with Athenians being the prime offenders.

I think to tackle the 50 man deep Thebans we may have to revert to our sources. 

Was the clash of the Thebans and the Spartans slow and measured? 

Were the Spartans continually driven back, as you'd expect from the weight of 50 men pressing on eight? 

Do our sources ascribe the Theban win to weight difference or do they highlight other factors instead/as well?

I recall mention of Leuctra being the one battle where Thebans went into action to the music of pipes and Spartans did not, which might argue for a certain deliberateness in their advance, but they nevertheless moved fast enough to catch the Spartans in the middle of a deployment change, which suggest they were closing faster than the Spartans were accustomed to.

Our basic source is Xenophon's Hellenica VI.4, and the key passage this:

"Coming now to the infantry, it was said that the Lacedaemonians led each half-company three files abreast, and that this resulted in the phalanx being not more than twelve men deep. The Thebans, however, were massed not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that if they conquered that part of the army which was around the king, all the rest of it would be easy to overcome.

[13] Now when Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, in the first place, before the troops under him so much as perceived that he was advancing, the horsemen had already joined battle and those of the Lacedaemonians had speedily been worsted; then in their flight they had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them. Nevertheless, the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time.

[14] But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back, gave way. Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp they grounded their arms at the spot from which they had set forth. The camp, to be sure, was not on ground which was altogether level, but rather on the slope of a hill."

From this, we can extract
1) The Spartans formed 12 deep
2) The Thebans formed 50 deep (most likely 50 rather than 48 because at Delium in 424 BC and on other occasions they had formed 25 deep)
3) The Spartans attempted to redeploy to 6 deep to flank the Thebans
4) They were caught mid-manoeuvre
5) Cleombrotus was killed
6) The Spartans recovered the body
7) Spartan losses greatly exceeded Theban
8 ) The Spartans were ultimately forced back by 'the pressure of the Theban mass' [tou okhlou ōthoumenoi].  The term ōthoumenoi is from ōtheō, to push back, force back in battle - the relationship to the term 'othismos' should be evident.

Hence it looks as if the Theban depth advantage conferred both weight and an advantageous casualty ratio.  Whether the latter was because Spartans fought until they dropped or for some other reason, the great depth of the Theban formation conferred a winning advantage in a frontal fight.

It took time to mature, though: at Delium, the Thebans deployed 25 deep against an Athenian army apparently 8 deep throughout, but the Thebans were still pushing back the Athenian left while the Athenian right was putting the Theban allies on the Boeotian left to rout.

The interesting point is that the Spartans were able to retrieve the fallen Cleombrotus, which indicates that their 6-8 deep formation was able to thrust back, or at least hold off, the 50-deep Thebans for a short while.  This shows what focussed, dedicated determination can do.  Unfortunately for the Spartans, as soon as they recovered Cleombrotus, the 'emergency stimulus' was gone and the desperation factor went out of their shove, allowing the superior weight of the Theban formation to start forcing them back.

Just come across these daft buggers... www.4hoplites.com. Seems their experiments have come up with the same view as the traditional (ie correct ) one!

Funny, that.

[Rob Miles]

8 ) The Spartans were ultimately forced back by 'the pressure of the Theban mass' [tou okhlou ōthoumenoi].  The term ōthoumenoi is from ōtheō, to push back, force back in battle - the relationship to the term 'othismos' should be evident.

Hence it looks as if the Theban depth advantage conferred both weight and an advantageous casualty ratio.  Whether the latter was because Spartans fought until they dropped or for some other reason, the great depth of the Theban formation conferred a winning advantage in a frontal fight.

I think that just about wraps up the argument. Despite buying up all the Loebs I can find on e-bay (only to find they're cheaper and better brand new from Amazon! D'oh!) my reading on the subject is very distant. Thanks for the discussion. It has been the most stimulating discussion I have had since falling ill.

I take it, then, that there are no rules which give Hoplites their historical advantage by advancing in depth and that playing them in that fashion would be detrimental? It seems a pity to play with hoplites lined up just two deep like any other spearmen.

[RobertGargan]

Impetus, has a stab at it, allowing for large units of hoplites, along with the increased danger of a flank attack.
Robert Gargan

[Erpingham]

From this, we can extract
1) The Spartans formed 12 deep
2) The Thebans formed 50 deep (most likely 50 rather than 48 because at Delium in 424 BC and on other occasions they had formed 25 deep)
3) The Spartans attempted to redeploy to 6 deep to flank the Thebans
4) They were caught mid-manoeuvre
5) Cleombrotus was killed
6) The Spartans recovered the body
7) Spartan losses greatly exceeded Theban
8 ) The Spartans were ultimately forced back by 'the pressure of the Theban mass' [tou okhlou ōthoumenoi].  The term ōthoumenoi is from ōtheō, to push back, force back in battle - the relationship to the term 'othismos' should be evident.

Hence it looks as if the Theban depth advantage conferred both weight and an advantageous casualty ratio.  Whether the latter was because Spartans fought until they dropped or for some other reason, the great depth of the Theban formation conferred a winning advantage in a frontal fight.

So, despite the Spartans being caught changing formation and losing their leader, they didn't cave in quickly (which was a result in other hoplite battles).  In theory, they could have held until rescued by the other flank being victorious but the other flank, though doing better, didn't smash their opposition either.  So any depth rule should count over time in a hoplite fight, not be critical immediately.  It is also clear that the deep mass does not move especially slowly, as perhaps the Spartans anticipated it would.  So special move rules don't seem required.

It is interesting to wonder how the Spartans would have effectively used their overlap if they had been able to complete their manoeuver.

Do the battles with the Thebans 25 deep tell us any more about the mechanisms of fighting in depth (not that we need them for rules purposes - just curious)?

[Rob Miles]

No it is clear enough from Xenophon that it was the depth and the eventual supremacy of their momentum that won. Do not forget that the Spartiates were (I believe) unbeaten in conventional hoplite-on-hoplite battle until this point. Had the Thebans not been in such depth, they would not have defeated them. That they did not cave in immediately could be down to many factors, but 'not caving in immediately' is likely to be measured in seconds rather than hours.

[Erpingham]

That they did not cave in immediately could be down to many factors, but 'not caving in immediately' is likely to be measured in seconds rather than hours.

Sorry, I can't agree with that from the Xenophon quote Patrick provided.  The Spartans are winning until the fall of Cleombrotus, when the succeed in carry him from the field.  This must have taken at least taken minutes.  The Spartans give way under pressure, which suggests they hold for some time.  The other flank see what is happening and fall back.  So, I'd suggest at least half an hour overall, possibly longer.

Timescale is on of those things which wargames rules are not very good at, and are usually fudged to some degree.  But I do think that we are looking at a situation in most rules where the Spartans hold for several moves.

[Rob Miles]

There can be no question that the Spartiates were the better warriors. Most wargames rules would have heavy infantry (elite) triumph over heavy infantry (average) irrespective of depth. This was the only time (as far as I know) the Spartiates were EVER defeated in a head-on hoplite-on-hoplite encounter and it is clearly stated that the depth and the 'pushing back' were what caused them to lose so drastically on this occasion. As for the left, it managed to retreat in good order to the camp which suggests they hadn't even been engaged, since close pursuit would have resulted in a rout. Recovering a body takes a handful of men about thirty seconds-- the entire unit did not stop to do it.

[Erpingham]

Recovering a body takes a handful of men about thirty seconds-- the entire unit did not stop to do it.

Xenophon, who knew a bit about hoplite fighting, says

Nevertheless, the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time.

I would contend that means that the Spartans didn't disintegrate on impact.

As to the depth issue, is anyone debating this?  The only debate is how, which Xenophon doesn't tell us, quite probably for the reason already given that he didn't explain what should have been obvious to his audience.

For gaming purposes, it doesn't matter much, if we take a "design for effect" approach.  However, whether it was gradual or instant and how inevitable the result was are design parameters I think do matter to a designer.

[Rob Miles]

I do not think the pushing would start at impact since it would need to be very orderly, and things happen at impact which would make that very risky. My own belief is that the excessively large phalanx cobbled together by the Thebans took a bit of time to get its act together, during which the superior discipline and strength of the Spartiates could well have had the advantage. Once the pushing got organised, the huge disparity between troop quality no longer mattered.

Non-hoplite deep spear formations were often a liability not just because of the waste of manpower but because they pinned their front ranks down, and when they did recoil, it was bedlam. Hoplite depth meant something because of the skilled drilling, something the Spartiates took to an extreme.

[Rob Miles]

Actually, I think Plutarch may have the solution <buries head in book> According to him, the vanguard of the Theban mega-phalanx (my term!) rushed ahead of the main body in order to stop the expansion manoeuvre, which would also explain why the Spartans were caught so off guard. The rest of the phalanx lumbered on behind and when it got stuck in, steamed right through them.

[Erpingham]

The appropriate Plutarch being this bit of Pelopidas?

In the battle, Epaminondas, bending his phalanx to the left, that, as much as possible, he might divide the right wing, composed of Spartans, from the other Greeks, and distress Cleombrotus by a fierce charge in column on that wing, the enemies perceived the design, and began to change their order, to open and extend their right wing, and, as they far exceeded him in number, to encompass Epaminondas. But Pelopidas with the three hundred came rapidly up, before Cleombrotus could extend his line, and close up his divisions, and so fell upon the Spartans while in disorder; though the Lacedaemonians, the expertest and most practised soldiers of all mankind, used to train and accustom themselves to nothing so much as to keep themselves from confusion upon any change of position, and to follow any leader, or right-hand man, and form in order, and fight on what part soever dangers press. In this battle, however, Epaminondas with his phalanx, neglecting the other Greeks, and charging them alone, and Pelopidas coming up with such incredible speed and fury, so broke their courage and baffled their art that there began such a flight and slaughter amongst the Spartans as was never before known. And so Pelopidas, though in no high office, but only captain of a small band, got as much reputation by the victory as Epaminondas, who was general and chief captain of Boeotia.

The 300 is this case are, as I understand it, the Theban Sacred Band.

[RobertGargan]

Could it be that by the time of Leuctra there were not so may highly motivated Spartiates in the section of the army facing the Thebans – or possibly in the rear lines.   If the file leaders needed to be elite troops to carry out drilled movements it could be that rear rankers were no longer life long hoplites and less likely to hold their ground.  After all the Spartans had used thousands of their own serfs, their helots, as hoplites.
Ironically, it was the traditional hoplite army of Epaminondas, a crafty general, who made good use of the Sacred Band, backed up by a deep formation of tough agrarian citizens, which put an end to the innovative Spartans.

Robert Gargan

[Rob Miles]

If this is the case, it would explain matters: the Spartans see the large phalanx heading their way and believe they have time to extend their line. Pelopidas and the Sacred Band who were in the vanguard of the phalanx sped forward to spoil it, managed to pin the Spartans and, perhaps, get a stab in at Cleombrotus at that point (he would have been directing the manoeuvre at the front, like any proper Spartan leader). The Spartans, as Plutarch states, recovered from this (enough to rescue the body which Xenophon confesses he only surmised sufficient to suggest the Spartans held their ground long enough to do this) but then the rest of the phalanx led by Epaminondas arrived and overwhelmed them.

Plutarch was writing some time later, of course, but he was usually thorough in gathering information from a variety of sources (although I think the Roman habit of defamation confused him a bit...). After all, if you interviewed soldiers returning from Arnhem, they'd say they were surrounded by superior numbers. Only by more measured analysis of all accounts some years later do we find that was not the case.