Chariots as equid battering rams

[Duncan Head]

turbata hinc etiam signa legionum multique impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen obtriti antesignani

Ben Foster renders this as:

from them the disorder was communicated to the standards of the legions, and many of the first line were trodden underfoot, as horses and chariots swept through their ranks.

OK, strictly speaking the hinc (from which disorder arose) does indeed refer to the preceding 'improvida fuga' of the Roman cavalry, but there is nothing I can see in the text or its sense to suggest any penetration of the Roman infantry by the Roman cavalry.  (If there is, please point it out.)  The disordering effect was moral rather than physical; the physical penetration - and the level of disorder which encouraged the Gallic infantry to attack - came from the 'impetu equorum ac vehiculorum raptorum per agmen' which 'obtriti' the 'antesignani', i.e. the impetus of the horses and vehicles tearing through the 'agmen' (formation) crushing the hastati and principes (not all of them obviously, as there were plenty left for the Gallic infantry to attack).

I think Patrick is undoubtedly correct - there is nothing to suggest explicitly that the routing Roman cavalry physically disrupted their own infantry - but so is Rich: Livy is clear that the Roman infantry were disordered by the flight of the cavalry, even if it was solely caused by morale failure, so the result was that the Roman line was already in disorder when the chariots hit them. I forget what the original point at issue was (no, actually, I haven't been following this thread closely enough to care) but if it's about Celtic chariots charging into a solid line, this incident is not evidence for them hitting an infantry line in good order.

[Erpingham]

If that were so, his supposedly fictionalised account of Thymbra would have the Egyptians beating their spears against their shields to scare the chariot horses.

Why?  He hasn't made his chariots the same - why make his infantry identical?

First point, there is no reason to suppose his account of Thymbra is fictional. 

This is the general consensus.  It appears to be based on reason.

Second point, the chariots at Cunaxa which went through the Greek lines were the crewless ones, so if he is extrapolating from experience the chariots crashing into the Egyptians would be those whose crews had managed a 'preliminary athletic departure'.

Didn't I mention something on better crewed?  He is of a mind that the weapon would do better with determined crewing.

Which somewhat over-represents the average capability of Asiatic infantry in general.  1) They were not necessarily a 'tight crowd'

True, and we all agree that loose order or disordered infantry were the natural prey of chariots.  I think, though, we have been concentrating on the ones here that were a tight crowd.

their intent was often more influenced by the question of apprehending rather than inflicting harm.

In which case, why bring them to the battlefield?  Any evidence for this view, or is it drawn a priori from theory?  Again, the effectiveness of Asiatic infantry might make a better topic on its own

We do not know that they were going 'flat out'.

I'm sure it was you who said they were going at 15mph - you even corrected my proposed experiment on this basis.  Justin envisages a gallop, based on his choice of video evidence.

We have not realy explored the role of light chariots at all, and if there was any such disposal activity, where is it?  And what fallacy?  All this expostulation began when the lighter chariotry at Sentinum was shown to have acted as 'smaller battering rams' and not as skirmishers in any shape or form.

If we can't agree what we have discussed, it probably time to stop.  I recall determining differences between two modes of chariotry in Xenophon, a brief discussion of Egyptian chariots, some thoughts on whether light chariots acted like light cavalry within an army (you were unhappy about assigning them a scouting role), some detail on the use of chariots by the Britons and Caledonians.  A suggestion was made that, except in Gallic and Galatian armies, light and heavy chariots didn't co-exist, which may imply an evolution of roles (or not). No evidence has been provided that light chariots were used to crash into formed enemy units.   Nor that they were used sacrificially to ram other chariots.

While it has proved valuable of Justin to raise the question and it has led to a useful exploration of the chariot topic (and has spawned a number of other themes to explore like the nature of Near Eastern infantry) we know we are no longer moving forward when we have to keep repeating what has gone before.

[Andreas Johansson]

In another thread, Duncan was quoting the Arthashastra X.v to the effect that the gap between chariots should be four samas, or about 4'8". Not that there's any reason Egyptian tactics have to have been the same as Indian, but this is surely too tight to allow turning or threading.

This article by Alexander Nefedkin may be useful.  Just glancing, I note a different translation of the passage above as a gap of 11.5m.  Nefedkin seems to have written a lot on chariots but I have no idea if he has any reputation.

The inscrutable workings of memory brought this to my mind again. Checking the Nefedkin passage I'm a bit confused, because he attributes intervals of both 11.5 m and "four iama [sic], about one meter" to Arthashastra 10.5. Since he latter equates a distance between lines of "five bows" with "about eleven and a half meters", I suspect that the longer interval is between ranks, the shorter between files. The difference between Nefedkin's "about one meter" and Duncan's ca 4'8" can probably be ascribed to the inexact nature of ancient units of measurement.

Also, if the longer interval were between files, the passage would also be prescribing intervals of over five meters between infantry files (2 samas as opposed to the chariots' 4 samas), which is surely unlikely.

Nefedkin's iama must be a typo for sama - it doesn't look like a possible Sanskrit word.

[Erpingham]

Checking the Nefedkin passage I'm a bit confused, because he attributes intervals of both 11.5 m and "four iama [sic], about one meter" to Arthashastra 10.5.

Maybe just a typo? 1.15m instead of 11.5m?

[Andreas Johansson]

Checking the Nefedkin passage I'm a bit confused, because he attributes intervals of both 11.5 m and "four iama [sic], about one meter" to Arthashastra 10.5.

Maybe just a typo? 1.15m instead of 11.5m?

If so it must be a typo in Nefedkin's source, because he makes a point of it being close to the ca 10 m he says is required for turning.

The citation given is P. C. Chakravarti, The Art of War in Ancient India (Dacca 1941) 116.

BTW, he compares the Arthashastra here to a Chinese treatise he calls "Lu Tao" (pinyin Lu Dao?). Anyone know what this is? It's apparently one of the Seven Military Classics, but I can't recognize it in WP's listing of those.

[Duncan Head]

BTW, he compares the Arthashastra here to a Chinese treatise he calls "Lu Tao" (pinyin Lu Dao?). Anyone know what this is? It's apparently one of the Seven Military Classics, but I can't recognize it in WP's listing of those.

Liu Tao - the Six Secret Teachings attributed to the Taigong.

[Andreas Johansson]

Liu Tao - the Six Secret Teachings attributed to the Taigong.

Thanks

I see, BTW, that Kobo has an ebook edition of the Seven Military Classics available for $4.99. I feel an acquisition coming ...

(Altho, bizarrely, one which apparently uses Wade-Giles for Chinese names in The Art of War but pinyin in the rest. What the?)

[Duncan Head]

I imagine they've probably just recycled an existing translation of Sunzi. Giles' own 1910 translation is presumably out of copyright.

[Andreas Johansson]

I imagine they've probably just recycled an existing translation of Sunzi.

No doubt - but how hard could it be to go through it and bring it into line with the rest? It does raise a little worry about how well-edited the thing may be.

[Patrick Waterson]

Anthony,

Just to clear up (I hope) a few points:

Xenophon's Chariot Experience
What I am attempting to convey is that Xenohpon does not seem to have derived his Thymbra scythed chariots or their behaviour from his Cunaxa experiences.

Is Thymbra Fictional?
Academic consensus considers it so.  This unfortunately is not a reliable guide (if academic consensus were a reliable guide, who would need sources?), especially given Xenophon's opportunities for exposure to Persian historical tradition.

Asiatic Infantry
Perhaps the best indication of their overall morale and combat fitness is what happened when they encountered Greeks.

The 15 mph chariot
One of the curious features of Biblical era chariotry was the way the horses were attached to the chariots: the band around the front of the horse, with which the animal provides pulling power, was arranged not across the chest but across the lower part of the neck.  General modern opinion is that this would gradually strangle the horse at high speeds; perhaps this was the intention, and if so it would be a built-in speed limiter.

The arithmetic correction was simply that if one vehicle at 15 mph hits another at 15 mph the deceleration of each vehicle is 15-to-0 not 30-to-0.  That was all.  It does of course make a big difference to the severity of impact.

Overall
Re-reading Justin's posts, I do not think he was insisting that chariots would charge at full gallop; he was simply pointing out that horses travelling at speed have a lot of knockdown power in them, rather more than we might expect, and hence even a 'light' chariot could be expected to crunch its way through lines of infantry without too much trouble.

That statement needs a little more precision: infantry in great depth (as Biblical formations seem to have been, at least on occasion) would not be fully penetrable by chariots, and hence great depth (cf. the 100-deep Egyptians at Thymbra) conferred deterrence if not immunity.  Cohesive infantry capable of file support (hoplites) would be much more resistant to attempted chariot penetration.  Such infantry could operate with shallower depths and still be significantly chariot resistant (it is perhaps noteworthy that in Greece the decline of the chariot seems to be parallelled by the rise of the hoplite).

I suppose what is ultimately at issue here is the cherished (including by myself until recently) precept whereby 'light' chariots (our designation, not that of the original owners) were built for skirmishing and were intended to skirmish.  The more I look into the sources, the less tenable this viewpoint appears to be.

[Jim Webster]

Anthony,

Just to clear up (I hope) a few points:

Xenophon's Chariot Experience
What I am attempting to convey is that Xenohpon does not seem to have derived his Thymbra scythed chariots or their behaviour from his Cunaxa experiences.

Xenophon's experience may not have been limited to Cunaxa. After all he might have been present to see a genuine success.

Hellenica iv 1 17
"In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, collecting supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system of forage. On one of these occasions the troops, who had grown reckless and scornful of the enemy through long immunity from attack, whilst engaged in collecting supplies were scattered over the flat country, when Pharnabazus fell upon them with two scythe-chariots and about four hundred horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together, mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did not hesitate, but placing his chariots in front, supported by himself and the cavalry, he gave the command to charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered the compact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the dust about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near."


Firstly the infantry were not formed up at the start of the action, and may not have been properly organised when the chariots hit. Also some people have commented that the infantry may have been light troops, perhaps peltasts. This would make sense in that hoplite armies would use their light troops to pillage and forage, and keep their hoplites back in support, especially in hostile territory. 

[Dangun]

Is Thymbra Fictional?
Academic consensus considers it so.  This unfortunately is not a reliable guide (if academic consensus were a reliable guide, who would need sources?), especially given Xenophon's opportunities for exposure to Persian historical tradition.

Given how often parallel sources differ in detail, and how often unique sources err,  I doubt the utility of assuming all literary sources are factually correct on  all points.

[Patrick Waterson]

Xenophon's experience may not have been limited to Cunaxa. After all he might have been present to see a genuine success.

And whether or not he saw it, he certainly knew of it.  Well noted.   Less easy is extrapolating his Thymbra chariot account from this incident and his Cunaxa experiences.

Given how often parallel sources differ in detail, and how often unique sources err,  I doubt the utility of assuming all literary sources are factually correct on  all points.

Well, they are not.  But they do seem more reliable as providers of basic information than the chewed-over leavings after such information has been through several generations of academics, the received academic wisdom not only drifting ever further from the original sources but also changing approximately once per generation*.  Jim's comment about 'reality' being made to fit perceptions of itself would seem to be at the root of the process.  And if people do not like the information a source provides, they do noticeably try to undermine the source.  Also, occasional attempted reputation-making by assault on a defenceless source has been known.  I am not saying that our sources are sacrosanct, omniscient or infallible; rather, that they are the basic starting-point for our historical information and as such should be treated with more consideration than is generally the case - and read more closely to see what they actually say.

*It is called 'progress' but resembles spontaneous mutation.

FYI, in the coming months you will see me pointing out serious flaws in one of our key historical sources - Manetho, or what remains of his writings in Josephus, Eusebius and Africanus.  Paradoxically, although Manetho is in many details grumbled at as unreliable (and rightly so), his dynastic scheme is followed with the iron rigour of fanaticism.  The result is a forced incompatibility between Egyptian history and the history of surrounding lands - but that is beyond the scope of this thread (unless you count the chariots).

I shall be interested to see if anyone insists upon the inviolability of Manetho's scheme of dynasties.

[Jim Webster]

Xenophon's experience may not have been limited to Cunaxa. After all he might have been present to see a genuine success.

And whether or not he saw it, he certainly knew of it.  Well noted.   Less easy is extrapolating his Thymbra chariot account from this incident and his Cunaxa experiences.

Not really, he's been in the same army as people who commanded and deployed scythed chariots. So he would doubtless have known what they wanted the chariots to do
He could extrapolate from their opinions and perhaps even experience in the east

[Erpingham]

Not really, he's been in the same army as people who commanded and deployed scythed chariots. So he would doubtless have known what they wanted the chariots to do
He could extrapolate from their opinions and perhaps even experience in the east

maybe Patrick will accept it if you say it