1211 velite reforms

[Mark G]

well if they are all wealthy enough to support their farm and family for a year on campaign, then any basis for reequipping them must be entirely due to a tactical requirement.

which matters for this debate, not to mention many others.

[Justin Swanton]

We could just call him the 'least wealthy'.

Or even 'economically emergent small-scale production agricultural sector class'. 

[Patrick Waterson]

Indeed. 

The Romans paid their soldiery when on campaign (at least from the 4th century BC, traditionally starting with the siege of Veii) so the state supported the men on campaign.  Of course, this meant someone had to pay the state, and this is where property classes came in - and Rome's allies were occasionally encouraged to make contributions in cash or in kind.  The velite's problems began when he returned home to his farm and nobody was paying his upkeep any longer.

Actually he would not usually face serious problems, at least not before the mid-second century BC.  His farm would be intact (perhaps worked by a slave or two under the supervision of a relative), his tax burden would be minimal (admittedly so would his income) and he would probably have a little sideline of his own, hunting or crafting something useful.  Peer pressure and social mores would discourage him from drinking his holdings away, so with a little bit he had picked up from campaign he might manage to afford a bit more land, and at worst would carry on much as before.

There were two exceptions to this general rule.  The first was that Gallic invasions and Hannibal's campaigns, plus the occasional bit of Italian infighting, would devastate tracts of farmland, and if yours happened to be among them it was bad news - unless you could restock and replant and rebuild, your long-term prospects might not be good.   The other and far more endemically destructive occurrence was when Rome began to spread its empire beyond Italy and armies were required to campaign away from home for extended periods of time.  This had two effects: the first was that instead of being able to return to the farm every year and put things straight, the soldier would return to a neglected property several years later and have great trouble putting it into shape again.  The second was that wealth from overseas was finding its way into the hands of a number of men who were both unscrupulous and acquisitive: these men bought up vast tracts of land, worked them with slaves and cornered the market in foodstuffs.  Individually-worked farms simply could not compete, and increasingly bankrupt farmers often had to sell out to the major landowners, possibly having to become part of their retinue of guards and gangs simply in order to survive.  This ultimately killed the Roman Republic and arguably the Republican legion - as the traditional manpower base of both was eroded and institutions were overshadowed by individuals, armies became followings for successful generals rather than the instruments of the senate and people of Rome.  Men without property replaced men with property as the foundation of the legion, and men with followings replaced men with integrity as the basis of the state.

It all gets very sociological and a bit off the point about exactly what the 211 BC 'reforms' were - not really reforms, but rather the creation of a new arm: infantry to ride with cavalry.  This seems to have been ephemeral, as I find no further references to it (albeit not having looked very hard) until Caesar did much the same thing in 48 BC.

[Justin Swanton]

Individually-worked farms simply could not compete, and increasingly bankrupt farmers often had to sell out to the major landowners, possibly having to become part of their retinue of guards and gangs simply in order to survive.  This ultimately killed the Roman Republic and arguably the Republican legion - as the traditional manpower base of both was eroded and institutions were overshadowed by individuals, armies became followings for successful generals rather than the instruments of the senate and people of Rome.  Men without property replaced men with property as the foundation of the legion, and men with followings replaced men with integrity as the basis of the state.

Also creating a huge crowd of dispossessed former farmers (or descendants of former farmers) at Rome, which had to be fed and amused. By Cicero's time the Republic would have been more accurately called the Senatus Turbaque Romana - The Senate and Mob of Rome.

[Mark G]

I don't think it is sociological at all.

either the velite is too poor to have a decent sword and shield - and thus is reequipped as per the suggestion that there was a reform.

or he is more than able to provide for this himself, in which case the 'reform' beings to look a lot more like a special expeditionary force of men required to act as cavalry supports who are selected by their ability to keep up with horsemen.

additionally, there is the age factor - if he is mature enough to own his own farm, he would surely be in the hastatii at least, and much more likely, in the principes, would he not?

given the age criteria and selection, would it in fact be safe to say that almost all velities would be young sons not yet old enough to serve in the hastatii?

[Patrick Waterson]

Probably, Mark: Polybius' explanation goes thus:

"The Military Tribunes at Rome, after the administering of the oath to their men, and giving out the day and place at which they are to appear without arms, for the present dismiss them. When they arrive on the appointed day, they first select the youngest and poorest [neōtatous kai penikhrotatous] to form the Velites, the next to them the Hastati [tous d' hexēs toutois eis tous hastatous kaloumenous], while those who are in the prime of life [akmaiotatous] they select as Principes, and the oldest of all [presbutatous = aged, senior] as Triarii. For in the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only as to their ages [helikiais = time of life or military age grouping] and nomenclature [onomaision = designation], but also as to the manner in which they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such proportions that the senior men, called Triarii, should number six hundred, the Principes twelve hundred, the Hastati twelve hundred, and that all the rest as the youngest [tous de loipous kai neōtatous = (lit.) all the remaining and youngest] should be reckoned among the Velites. And if the whole number of the legion is more than four thousand, they vary the numbers of these divisions proportionally, except those of the Triarii, which is always the same." - Polybius VI.21.6-10

This has occasionally been read as the very youngest (only) becoming the velites, but the essential division appears to be between the velites and hastati who are 'youngest' and the principes who are in their 'prime of life'.

There does seem to be a bias towards the velites being the youngest, as in VI.22.1 he writes:

The youngest soldiers [neōtatois] are ordered to carry a sword [makhaira], spears [grosphous = specifically the velite javelin], and target [parmen = parma].

I also get the impression from VI.23.1 that the hastati are an age category up from the velites:

tois ge mēn deuterois men kata tēn hēlikian, hastatois ...

This can be rendered:

The second age group along, the hastati ...

Which puts the hastati in a separate age group.  Both the velites and the hastati are too young to be 'in the prime of life', a category specific to the principes.  The impression I get from VI.22.1 and VI.23.1 is that the age group is supposed to determine all and predominate even over the wealth category, whereas VI.21 suggests that velites and hastati are categorised more according to need (how big a legion do we want?) than on strict property or age qualifications.  One imagines that the rules or guidelines would be more rigorously applied when the need for troops was least, and somewhat bent during emergencies.  In 211 BC the Romans were scraping up troops wherever they could find them, so there would in all likelihood be plenty of what would in other times have been strictly underage men in the hastati.

... the 'reform' beings to look a lot more like a special expeditionary force of men required to act as cavalry supports who are selected by their ability to keep up with horsemen.

Or ride double behind the horsemen, which would be a reason for giving them the unusual smaller shield - a full-size parma might be too inconvenient if the infantryman 'riding pillion' has to hold onto the cavalryman.  If this was the reason for the smaller shield, one is struck by the attention to detail exhibited by classical armies, which were prepared to make or procure equipment specially designed for a particular role, and to do it quickly and without fuss.

[Mark G]

so having disposed of the red herring which is poverty.

we can look again at whether there was a tactical decision to re-equip these skirmishers.

option 1 - a one off role to act as cavalry supports.
option 2 - a more permanent change to better equip them for hand to hand encounters with other skirmishers.

evidence seems widely open to interpretation.

if we had some notions of what other latin skirmishers were equipped with, it might help - would you need to carry a sword and shield against them?
were they also drawn from the younger men?

the basis for the case I initially found and questioned seems to be that despite having many times more velites than their counterparts, Rome was out skirmished repeatedly by the professional mercenaries which Hannibal had with him while in Italy.

we know those guys include Balearic slingers in some numbers (much better weapons and longer range - and adults), and I think also a good number of adult javelin skirmishers too - so there is a consistency to the case, just as there is with the mounted support interpretation.

perhaps if we had a bit more evidence on what they faced prior to Hannibal descending it might give a clue as to whether they needed shields and proper side arms before then.

[Patrick Waterson]

This leads into the question of what the legion was composed of and when.  As of 340 BC (before the Romans really got stuck into the Samnites, although they had a brush in 343-342 which according to Livy went well for them) there were only 300 skirmishing types in the whole legion (20 leves as part of each of 15 maniples of hastati).  At some indeterminate point between then and the First Punic War the legionary organisation changed - exactly when has been a past point of furious debate and hopeful rather than definite conclusions.

The overall picture seems to be that before seriously taking on the Samnites the Romans had only a sprinkling of skirmishers.  After two Samnite wars (or perhaps after three) they had about a quarter of the legion as skirmishers.  Unfortunately we know even less about Samnite organisation (or for that matter any other Italian army) than we do about Roman organisation, so we have no obvious way of telling whether this was a case of adapting to match Samnite practice or a change for some other reason.

Livy, interestingly, refers to 'Samnite legions' (legiones Samnitium, e.g. in IX.23.3), suggesting the Samnites had developed a legionary organisation of their own.

A key event determining and perhaps timing the change in legionary organisation may have been the Battle of Tarracina in 314 BC: here, Livy tells us that

The troops on the left, besides being drawn up in closer order, had received an accession to their strength from a plan conceived on the spur of the moment by Poetelius. [10] for those subsidiary cohorts which were wont to be kept fresh in reserve, to meet the chance needs of a long engagement, he sent immediately into the fighting line; and by using all his strength at once, he forced the enemy back at the first assault. - Livy IX.27.9-10

While there is nothing about skirmishers, Poetelius seems to have committed his rorarii (whose role iin the 340 BC legion was to reinforce the hastati and principes part-way through the action) at the outset, and the result was success.  This could well have been the spur for changing the legion to a 'front-loaded' configuration with the triarii as a vestigial contingent and the main strength in the hastati and principes (the rorarii had previously been the youngest and least experienced men in the army).  The increased complement of velites would have arisen from another cause, and here one might speculate that the Romans had been consistently out-skirmished by the Samnites, which would have encouraged them to increase the number of skirmishers in the legion.  Unfortunately we have no proof one way or the other, only the apparent fact that before the Samnite wars the Romans had only a sprinkling of skirmishers (300) who carried 'a spear and javelins' and following the Samnite wars the Romans had a lot of skirmishers (1,200) whose equipment as of the mid-2nd century BC is described by Polybius (javelins, sword, shield) but we have no hint in Livy or Polybius that this had changed during or between the Punic Wars.  Possibly the easiest conclusion is that re-equipment with sword and shield in place of the spear took place as a result of the Samnite wars, together with adopting the new legionary organisation with its abolition of the rorarii and introduction of the velites.  Number-wise, 300 leves and 900 rorarii seem to provide us with 1,200 velites, though whether there is a direct relationship here is less clear.  It can nevertheless do as a working hypothesis.

Hannibal fielded a considerable contingent of skirmishers - Polybius gives him 8,000 at the Trebia.  The Roman force there amounted to four legions and four allied alae (Italian legion-equivalents), which between them could field perhaps 9,600 velite-type skirmishers.  Numbers were thus more or less comparable, but the Romans were disadvantaged by having thrown most of their javelins at the Numidians in earlier skirmishing, not to mention getting wet in the near-freezing river.  Conditions rather than equipment handicapped the Romans.

The next skirmisher vs skirmisher lineup was at Cannae, and here the restricted frontage meant that a probable 18,000 Roman and Italian skirmishers were deployed facing 8-10,000 Carthaginian skirmishers (there may or may not have been some Gallic skirmishers helping out Hannibal's original 8,000).  In this engagement there was really nothing for the skirmishers to do except exchange missiles until the main armies were ready for action, so neither contingent put much effort into trying to overcome the other.

A notable difference in doctrine was exhibited at the Trebia.  All indications are that when Roman velites finished skirmishing, they rejoined and were reintegrated into their parent maniples of hastati, principes or triarii.  Carthaginian skirmishers, on the other hand, fell back through their heavy infantry and regrouped on the flanks - and at the Trebia made themselves very useful this way.  At Cannae we have no indication they still did this, and it is quite likely that Hannibal had adopted the Roman system of absorbing them into his 'legions' - not necessarily all of them, as the Balearic slingers would not fit well into a legionary system, but the bulk of the javelinmen (logkhephoroi) would be natural candidates for this.

What may be noteworthy is that the Romans did not feel it incumbent on themselves to make any changes to their skirmisher organisation in response to their defeats by Hannibal in 218-216 BC.  Had they felt the need, such changes would have taken place in 215 or at the latest 214 BC - they would not have waited until 211.  The absence of any reference to changes in velite equipment in 215-214 is perhaps telling.

[Mark G]

if we are postulating all of these changes as being caused by fighting up in Samnite hill country - which is not at all unreasonable to do - then it does seem that having a massed skirmishing component, backed up by a flexible fighting skirmish component (hastatii) would enable you to feel out the deployments before committing properly and potentially exposing your flanks.

which in turn does support the idea that the early velites were not equipped with a substantial side arm or a shield, as they were not expected to need it.

further, I can quite easily see javelin armed high school seniors and undergraduates being forced back by professional slingers - for which you obviously give them a small shield - and monstered up close by the adults if they do stay in position - again, for which you add a side arm.

it strikes me that skirmishing as a youngster is a comparatively safe way to be introduced to warfare - when that skirmishing is on a reasonably equal footing.  But is a very risky thing to do long term with your boys when they are facing professional adults.

conversely, if your cavalry are being bested, and you decide to bolster them by adding light supports, you would want men used to getting in close, rather than men used to keeping a distance.

[Patrick Waterson]

Unless there was an ambush there would be no need to 'feel out' deployments, as it was customary for both armies to deploy in full view of each other.  Hastati were formed line-of-battle troops: it was the velites who would have been really useful for rough terrain scouting and ambush-tripping, and the Caudine Forks (321 BC) and Latulae (315 or 316 BC), in each of which the Romans were trapped or ambushed by the Samnites, were both before the change to the velite-heavy Polybian legion.

If messing about in rough terrain a shield is quite handy as one will not always be able to dodge every missile coming one's way, and at times will get up close and personal with bolder enemy skirmishers or will be faced with a wounded opponent who has to be finished off but is still capable of wielding a weapon.

Skirmishing in this era seemed to have a fairly low casualty ratio, so yes, it does seem a good way to start youngsters on their military career - and allows one to find out early who exhibits soldierly qualities and who is inclined to duck out or fumble their actions, because the lads are performing in full view of the army.

Perhaps more significant than slingers in a skirmish were the more numerous opposing Carthaginian lonchophoroi, professional javelinmen with thonged javelins, giving them a range and accuracy advantage.  None of our sources, however, seem to indicate that the Carthaginians had any major skirmishing advantage despite the experience and professionalism of their skirmishers, although as skirmishing is not usually a battle-decider nobody seems to have bothered detailing it, but if the Carthaginians did have a dramatic skirmishing superiority the Romans would not have waited seven years to do something about it.

[Mark G]

hang on Pat, that is exactly the attitude which the lowland Romans took into the hills - and got caught out by a Claudine forks and a few other places.

if both armies did always agree to fight in the open and clear, then there would be no need to make any change when fighting the Samnites at all.

[Patrick Waterson]

Not quite, Mark: please observe the distinction between 'customary' and 'always'.

[Mark G]

perhaps, but you probably do need to give an alternative explanation for Roman army reforms which are currently taken by most as to be concurrent with the Samnite wars.

why change the army when fighting these guys? why introduce such a massive skirmish component? why such a half way stage of partially armoured heavy-javelin men before the fully armoured (originally spear armed) chaps get introduced?

especially as these wars take place in forested hill country, which is quite distinct from the previous lowland agricultural land opponents which preceded that reorganisation.

[Patrick Waterson]

Are we actually saying the same thing, namely that the change from 300 leves to 1,200 velites as the skirmishing component of the legion resulted from, or at least took place during, the Samnite wars?

why change the army when fighting these guys? why introduce such a massive skirmish component?

The answer regarding the 'massive skirmish component' may lie in the ambush at Latulae, or it may just be that the Romans increasingly felt that the traditional system of using maniples of rorarii for piecemeal reinforcement of disadvantaged sections of the hastati and principes lines was no longer useful against the Samnites - in 314 BC at the battle of Tarracina the consul Marcus Poetelius Libo did something different:

"For those subsidiary cohorts [subsidarias cohortes] which were wont to be kept fresh in reserve, to meet the chance needs of a long engagement, he sent immediately into the fighting line; and by using all his strength at once, he forced the enemy back at the first assault."

The success of this measure may have brought to a head a growing feeling that the legion of 15 maniples per line with rorarii 'top-up' reserves and a sprinkling of leves for skirmishing was past its use-by date.  At any rate, the next legion pattern we encounter is the Polybian, with identical (1,200-man) establishments of hastati and principes (although the leves have gone and the hastati are now all heavy infantry), a reduced triarii contingent (600 rather than 900) and the new troop component: 1,200 velites.  Leves are expressly described by Livy as unshielded: there are, as far as I know, no references whatsoever to unshielded velites.

Velites, if one looks through Polybius' Book VI, do more than just skirmish on the battlefield.

"The perimeter [kharax = palisade] is lined by the velites, who are on guard all along it from day to day. That is their special duty; while they also guard all the entrances to the camp, telling off ten sentinels to take their turn at each of them."

Triarii gave up camp guard duty at some point between 437 and 394 BC; velites assumed it at some point following 314 BC, perhaps in 309 when Lucius Papirius Cursor was appointed dictator, perhaps even earlier, as Papirius was consul in 313 BC.  Nobody states who did it in the interim period, though my guess is that it would have fallen to the rorarii.

... why such a half way stage of partially armoured heavy-javelin men before the fully armoured (originally spear armed) chaps get introduced?

Not sure exactly what you mean here, Mark.  Would it be possible to elaborate?

The move from the 'Livian' legion described in Livy VIII.8 at the Battle of Vesuvius in 340 BC to the 'Polybian' legion in Book VI of the eponymous history marks a considerable change and reorganisation: numbers remain constant, or nearly so, but the legion changes from a deliberately-paced fighting machine with 15-maniple lines and almost half its strength 'behind the standards' to a more aggressive configuration with 10-maniple lines and four-fifths of its strength in advance of the standards.  Instead of keeping back rorarii to top up failing maniples of hastati and subsequently principes, the new legion sends its velites to begin the battle by skirmishing and then drop back to form the rear two ranks of each heavy infantry formation.  The velites seem to be a compromise between the more specific functions of the old leves and the old rorarii - and their equipment as described by Polybius reflects this.

"The youngest soldiers, the velites, are ordered to carry a sword [makhaira], javelins [grosphous] and a shield [parmen]."

The hastati are heavy infantry pure and simple:

"The second group, the Hastati, are ordered to have the complete panoply [panoplian]. This to a Roman means, first, a large shield [thureos], the surface of which is curved outwards, its breadth two and a half feet, its length four feet, - though there is also an extra sized shield in which these measures are increased by a palm's breadth ... With the shield they also carry a sword [makhaira] hanging down by their right thigh, which is called a Spanish [Iberiken] sword ... In addition to these they have two pila, a brass helmet, and greaves ... Besides these each man is decorated with a plume of feathers, with three purple or black feathers standing upright, about a cubit long. The effect of these being placed on the helmet, combined with the rest of the armour, is to give the man the appearance of being twice his real height, and to give him a noble aspect calculated to strike terror into the enemy. The common soldiers also receive a brass plate [khalkoma = bronze plate], a span square, which they put upon their breast and call a breastpiece [kardiophulaka = heart-guard], and so complete their panoply. Those who are rated above a hundred thousand asses, instead of these breastpieces wear, with the rest of their armour, coats of mail [thorakas]. The Principes and Triarii are armed in the same way as the Hastati, except that instead of pila the triarii carry long spears [dorata]." - Polybius VI.23

[Jim Webster]

Just to note that about the time we're discussing (211) wasn't there a big drop in the property qualification for the legions?

Jim