Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?

[Erpingham]

As suggested by Justin in the topic on the so-called Macedonian Double Whammy, something of a broader nature to allow that topic to continue to focus on the Macedonian phalanx.

I'll kick off :

"Once an army is on the march, it is weakened and cannot keep rank - something as minor as a bush can disrupt things"

Jean de Bueil Jouvencel

[Justin Swanton]

"on the march"

On the battlefield?

Actually it's something I've wondered about for a while, watching those RTW videos where the infantry pass right through rocks and bushes. Since few battlefields were as featureless as football fields, to what extend were infantry incommoded by terrain features and how did they compensate for them?

[Erpingham]

"on the march"

On the battlefield?

From the context, he clearly means advancing on a battlefield.

[aligern]

Isnt Jouvencel the one who believes that the tactical defensive always wins because the attacker becomes disordered as he advances?  I can see tgat beingga particular problem for medieval armies, , less so if the troops were say Roman legionaries, less densely packed and reliant upon forward movement to give impetus to their pila.
Roy

[Erpingham]

Isnt Jouvencel the one who believes that the tactical defensive always wins because the attacker becomes disordered as he advances?  I can see tgat beingga particular problem for medieval armies, , less so if the troops were say Roman legionaries, less densely packed and reliant upon forward movement to give impetus to their pila.
Roy

You remember your French literature correctly Roy.  Jean de Bueil does indeed make a strong case for fighting on the defensive because armies are disordered by advancing.  It wasn't a novel thought - IIRC, Chandos expressed a similar view a century or so earlier.  Both were experienced soldiers, which may suggest there was something in it.

As to Romans and other regular types, I'll let the better versed in the sources comment.  There may be a case for saying that the problem was more acute among less regular troops.

[DBS]

Is it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment?  Given Jean's period, he is operating against heavily armoured men at arms and English longbows.  If you are operating against melee troops - as say the Romans usually did - there is time and space to pause and sort out your dressing before the final advance to close the enemy.  The Romans, or hoplites, may be well armoured, but probably still have better situational awareness than a man at arms in a visored helmet.  And stopping to sort out your dressing a hundred yards from a bunch of English archers is probably sub optimal.  Conversely, if you sit and wait for the enemy to come to you, said English archers are not going to be behind carefully emplaced stakes for a start; either they leave them behind, or put themselves at a disadvantage trying to hammer them in just in front of you.  Discipline will certainly help, but may not be the primary factor.

[lionheartrjc]

It clearly wasn't an insurmountable problem because infantry lines did advance against enemy.

A phalanx is divided up into syntagma of 16x16.  You need (small) gaps between each syntagma to allow them to get around trees, bushes or other obstacles.  No gaps and everyone starts bumping into each other and chaos ensues.  If the gaps get too large, the result is possibly Pydna where the legionaries can exploit the gaps and slaughter the phalangites.

Too many obstacles and clearly you don't advance and fight - you find somewhere more suitable.

Richard

[Justin Swanton]

Out in the real world how many open spaces without features like trees, bushes and rocks are there that would be suitable as battlefields?

[Mark G]

Why ask that a Justin, when you simply refused to understand all of the explanations given when you put up a thread on it years ago?

If you really want to comprehend the answer to that question, I repeat my offer to get you started on tactical reading for the well documented Napoleonic period.

But I warn you, there are no useful video shortcuts, you have to read multiple books.

[Justin Swanton]

Why ask that a Justin, when you simply refused to understand all of the explanations given when you put up a thread on it years ago?

If you really want to comprehend the answer to that question, I repeat my offer to get you started on tactical reading for the well documented Napoleonic period.

But I warn you, there are no useful video shortcuts, you have to read multiple books.

Can you get a little more specific, Mark? For example, which of my posts is this a reply to?

[Mark G]

My apologies to you Justin.

I saw you asking about spaces and thought you were linking to the discussion on phalanxes and had returned to your questioning the gaps between units vs a single continuous line.

You were not, and I mis read through inattention and assumption.

[Justin Swanton]

 

[Erpingham]

Is it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment

The quote comes just after a description of what went wrong at Agincourt. 

Chamblay (the wise advisor Jouvencel is listening to) says

"[the French] had spent the night up to their knees in mud and then, the following morning, they'd had to struggle across a long stretch of wasteland to engage the enemy, which meant by the time they did so, they were out of breath and in disorder, when they did engage the enemy it was piecemeal and so were defeated"

So, he's not highlighting (or even mentioning) archery as a factor.  The risk of getting out of breath is perhaps related to the weight of equipment, though, and is a repeated theme. 

[Justin Swanton]

Is it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment

The quote comes just after a description of what went wrong at Agincourt. 

Chamblay (the wise advisor Jouvencel is listening to) says

"[the French] had spent the night up to their knees in mud and then, the following morning, they'd had to struggle across a long stretch of wasteland to engage the enemy, which meant by the time they did so, they were out of breath and in disorder, when they did engage the enemy it was piecemeal and so were defeated"

So, he's not highlighting (or even mentioning) archery as a factor.  The risk of getting out of breath is perhaps related to the weight of equipment, though, and is a repeated theme.

What's interesting is that doesn't seem to be the norm - Chamblay gives details as to why the French contacted the English piecemeal, as if it was something unusual worth dwelling on.

[Erpingham]

Is it perhaps less an issue of discipline/training, more a question of contemporary equipment

The quote comes just after a description of what went wrong at Agincourt. 

Chamblay (the wise advisor Jouvencel is listening to) says

"[the French] had spent the night up to their knees in mud and then, the following morning, they'd had to struggle across a long stretch of wasteland to engage the enemy, which meant by the time they did so, they were out of breath and in disorder, when they did engage the enemy it was piecemeal and so were defeated"

So, he's not highlighting (or even mentioning) archery as a factor.  The risk of getting out of breath is perhaps related to the weight of equipment, though, and is a repeated theme.

What's interesting is that doesn't seem to be the norm - Chamblay gives details as to why the French contacted the English piecemeal, as if it was something unusual worth dwelling on.

Each Chamblay anecdote is followed by a general  lesson - we've quoted the one for Agincourt above.  So the format suggests this is a general point drawn from a specific example.