Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?

[Mark G]

Wasn't it one of the reasons for the en haye thing the french had through the Renaissance, that only by enforcing a rule of honour that no one could get ahead of the king (or king appointed commander), that they could ensure that charges arrived at the same time and not piecemeal?

[Erpingham]

There is certainly a frequent rule that no-one should advance ahead of the banner, which was with the commander (one of Charny's questions - III.6 - is whether it should be in front or behind the commander as he leads the advance).  Whether this is just about honour or the rather more practical effect of regulating the speed of advance may be debated. 

[Mark G]

I don't think it's a debatable question at all.

You cannot order nobles to do things, but you can convince them that failing to behave honourable is bad.

So if you make it a mark of honour to stick to the most effective formation, you have ordered the unorderable

[Cantabrigian]

And stopping to sort out your dressing a hundred yards from a bunch of English archers is probably sub optimal. 

So maybe the advantage of English archers was not the casualties they caused, but that they forced the opposition to attack at the run?

[Erpingham]

And stopping to sort out your dressing a hundred yards from a bunch of English archers is probably sub optimal. 

So maybe the advantage of English archers was not the casualties they caused, but that they forced the opposition to attack at the run?

Although we lack evidence of that.  In our previous discussion of the effect of medieval archery, I managed to find one poetic reference to archery slowing an advance and one of cavalry charging to make contact in order to avoid archery.  Nothing on archery causing infantry to run.

If we return again to de Bueil, we find a description of a small skirmish which illustrates the points about defending not advancing.  Jouvencel and his troops have been confronted by a much larger enemy force unexpectedly.  Jouvencel dismounts his men and takes up a position behind a hedge.  His opponents confidentally dismount and "fast march" forward.

"By the time the enemy reached the ranks of Jouvencel and his men, the enemy were out of breath and all in confusion: some of them moved faster than others."

As a result Jouvencel defeats the first to reach his lines while the ones slower to engage are demoralised by the fate of the quickest and run away.  The defeat is ascribed to arrogance (or over-confidence) brought on by greater numbers.  The effect of archery is not highlighted.

[Mark G]

Noted this in an article on Verneuil just now. (Michale K Jones 2002)

"Waurin related how the line of men-at-arms moved onto the offensive.  Their only chance was to take the battle to the French before the Lombards reappeared.  They showed extraordinary discipline.  According to Waurin, the entire body went forward, keeping good order.  The line would briefly pause, let out a shout, and then continue its advance (footnoted Waurin III .p74).  The French also moved forward, hastily or eagerly, as some of the chronicles related, because they believed the battle was now theirs. In fighting between dismounted men-at-arms it was vital to keep formation.  In these difficult circumstances hope now arose for the English.  All sources agreed that the advancing French got out of alignment, some adding that the Viscount of Narbonne's contingent was ahead of its main battle and reached the English before the others.  This was a multinational army, with Scots, Spaniards and Italians all fighting on the French side, and maintaining cohesion in an advance would have been particularly difficult.  The English could use their full force in the forthcoming melee as the French units arrived piecemeal."

worth noting however, that the victory was ascribed in the end to great feats of individual heroism, mostly around saving banners which the men were using to guide them on who was winning beyond their immediate vision within the melee itself.

still, the point being that so much of the chronicles gave attention to the importance of maintaining formation into contact as offering a key advantage to the combat itself.

[Duncan Head]

So are we close to concluding that "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?" can be answered as "Infantry lines had to make significant efforts not to fragment when advancing against enemy"?

[Erpingham]

So are we close to concluding that "Did infantry lines fragment when advancing against enemy?" can be answered as "Infantry lines had to make significant efforts not to fragment when advancing against enemy"?

Certainly in the Middle Ages.

One interesting thing about Verneuil is both armies do advance against each other and, indeed, according to Wavrin, the English , as the two sides close, do run at the French after their steady approach.

[Justin Swanton]

Noted this in an article on Verneuil just now. (Michale K Jones 2002)

"Waurin related how the line of men-at-arms moved onto the offensive.  Their only chance was to take the battle to the French before the Lombards reappeared.  They showed extraordinary discipline.  According to Waurin, the entire body went forward, keeping good order.  The line would briefly pause, let out a shout, and then continue its advance (footnoted Waurin III .p74).  The French also moved forward, hastily or eagerly, as some of the chronicles related, because they believed the battle was now theirs. In fighting between dismounted men-at-arms it was vital to keep formation.  In these difficult circumstances hope now arose for the English.  All sources agreed that the advancing French got out of alignment, some adding that the Viscount of Narbonne's contingent was ahead of its main battle and reached the English before the others.  This was a multinational army, with Scots, Spaniards and Italians all fighting on the French side, and maintaining cohesion in an advance would have been particularly difficult.  The English could use their full force in the forthcoming melee as the French units arrived piecemeal."

worth noting however, that the victory was ascribed in the end to great feats of individual heroism, mostly around saving banners which the men were using to guide them on who was winning beyond their immediate vision within the melee itself.

still, the point being that so much of the chronicles gave attention to the importance of maintaining formation into contact as offering a key advantage to the combat itself.

Doesn't that rather make toast of the chequerboard? By definition a collection of piecemeal contingents. 

(just a humble suggestion. No desire to stir the pot, no desire at all...)

[Erpingham]

Doesn't that rather make toast of the chequerboard? By definition a collection of piecemeal contingents. 

Wavrin, as I understand him, says the two armies make a single battle each (though it would appear he is only talking of the men-at-arms here)  , though both battles are in two commands.  Where is the chequerboard or even the "piecemeal contingents"? 

[Justin Swanton]

Doesn't that rather make toast of the chequerboard? By definition a collection of piecemeal contingents. 

Wavrin, as I understand him, says the two armies make a single battle each (though it would appear he is only talking of the men-at-arms here)  , though both battles are in two commands.  Where is the chequerboard or even the "piecemeal contingents"?

I was applying this

All sources agreed that the advancing French got out of alignment, some adding that the Viscount of Narbonne's contingent was ahead of its main battle and reached the English before the others.  This was a multinational army, with Scots, Spaniards and Italians all fighting on the French side, and maintaining cohesion in an advance would have been particularly difficult.  The English could use their full force in the forthcoming melee as the French units arrived piecemeal.

to one of the conventional theories about the triplex acies, i.e. that the separate maniples fought as separate units and didn't form a continuous line. The fact that the English line had an advantage against French contingents of the battle arriving piecemeal suggested it. Admittedly rather off-topic.

[Duncan Head]

I would say rather that the chequerboard was a formation that was designed not to need a continuous line, so was less concerned about fragmenting.

[Andreas Johansson]

Whatever you think of the triplex acies, checkerboard deployments were used in the musket age, so there's presumably some utility to it.

[Mark G]

I refer Justin back to the response I had to withdraw a few days ago

[Justin Swanton]

Whatever you think of the triplex acies, checkerboard deployments were used in the musket age, so there's presumably some utility to it.

Pike squares which had an anti-cavalry front facing 4 directions within which the musketeers could shelter. Not a fragmented line as such, but now we're really going off-topic. I'm starting to feel guilty.